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O

ne week before the Argentine surrender at Port Stanley, the
well-respected British news journal, The Economist, published an article
captioned "War Laws-Made To Be Broken." After discussing a number of
provisions of the laws of war which the writer, obviously not an expert in the
field, thought had been violated during the course of the hostilities, he ended
up with this alarming conclusion: "These, and no doubt other matters not yet
to appear, will be the subject of anguished inquiry, once the fighting ends."
Despite such contentions, the laws of war were more widely observed in the
Falklands crisis than in any other conflict since World War II. This essay will
analyze severallaw-of-war problems that arose during the hostilities, and will
illustrate the degree to which both belligerents succeeded in observing legal
norms of combat without any significant military disadvantage.

Maritime Exclusion Zone
The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands began on 2 April 1982. Great
Britain broke off diplomatic relations that same day; but it was not until 7 April
1982, five days later, that Great Britain took its first real retaliatory step,
announcing that as from 12 April 1982 it was establishing a "maritime exclusion
zone" 200 miles around the Falkland Islands, and that any Argentine warships
and naval auxiliaries thereafter within that zone "will be treated as hostile and
are liable to be attacked by British forces." On the following day Argentina
responded by establishing a 200-mile defense zone off its coast and around the
Falklands.
When the British announcement was made the impression was given, and it
was generally understood, that the British nuclear submarine Superb was on

* The facts presented in this essay were drawn primarily from Christopher Dobson,
THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT (1982), and from press reports contained in such
publications as THE ECONOMIST, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, TIME, the NEW
YORK TIMES, and others for the period of 1 April to 1 July 1982.
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station in that area and this was undoubtedly the major reason for the failure of
the Argentine fleet to emerge from its base at Puerto Belgrano, south ofBuenos
Aires. There were later complaints that the press, as well as the Argentines, had
been intentionally misled when it was discovered that the Superb was at its base
in Scotland. However, this was a perfectly valid and successful piece of
"disinformation" by the British.
Since the 1856 Declaration of Paris it has been a settled rule of maritime
warfare that a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is, the
blockading belligerent must be able to enforce its announced blockade. The
British declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels
were not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy naval vessels.
It was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to the Argentine naval
forces. A state of armed conflict certainly existed between Argentina and Great
Britain and, hence, the armed forces of each, including naval vessels, were, apart
from some limitations not here applicable, subject to attack wherever found. In
any event, if, by disinformation, a belligerent can convince the enemy (and
neutrals) that there is an effective blockade in existence, then there is an effective
blockade.
On 23 April the British informed the Argentine government that "any
approach on the part of Argentine warships, submarines, naval auxiliaries or
military aircraft which would amount to a threat to interfere with the mission
of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate
response." At the same time it stated that "all Argentine vessels, including
merchant vessels or fishing vessels apparently engaged in surveillance of or
intelligence gathering activities against British forces in the South Atlantic, would
also be regarded as hostile." Then on 30 April the British extended their maritime
exclusion zone to include "any ships and any aircraft" found therein. This was
now a true blockade--and, presumably, there were now British submarines on
station in the area prepared to enforce the declaration. So far as is known, only
one Argentine support ship, the Formosa, managed thereafter to reach the
Falkland Islands. A number of military cargo aircraft were also successful in
reaching their destination before the British carriers arrived in the area. It is'
interesting to note that sometime after the hostilities had ended a United Press
International dispatch from Buenos Aires quoted an Argentine general as saying
that the British air and sea blockade "was a success, a total success."
On 2 May the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, was sunk by a British
submarine with a loss of almost 400 lives. The exact location of the Belgrano at
the time of the attack has not been officially disclosed, but there have been
suggestions that it was about 35 miles outside the maritime exclusion zone.
Certainly, a cruiser of a belligerent has no right to consider itself immune from
enemy attack because it is on the high seas beyond the range of a proclaimed
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maritime exclusion zone. Great Britain justified its action by pointing out that
the cruiser was a threat to its picket ships, frigates, and destroyers, and that it had
previously advised the Argentine government of the establishment ofa defensive
zone around units of the British fleet which the Belgrano had disregarded.
Sympathy for the Argentine loss, and the feeling that the British had somehow
been "unfair," were quickly dissipated when, two days later, on 4 May an Exocet
missile fired by an Argentine plane hit and sank the British destroyer Shtffield
with a loss of about twenty lives.
On 7 May the British extended their war zone to 12 miles off the Argentine
coast. This blockade was completely effective, made so by the Argentine fear
that if its fleet sortied from its base it would be the victim of the British nuclear
submarines which were now, beyond any doubt, patrolling the waters off the
coast of Argentina outside the twelve-mile limit. However, on 15 May the
Soviet Ambassador in London advised the British government that the Soviet
Union considered the British blockade to be unlawful because it "arbitrarily
proclaimed(ed) vast expanses of the high seas closed to ships and craft of other
countries," citing the 1958 Convention on the High Seas as the basis for its
claim. Of course, a blockade always denies the use of part of the high seas to
other countries. While the Soviet Union might have questioned the extent of
the blockaded area as excessive, if the blockade was effective (and there seems
little doubt that it was), it was a valid blockade under the 1856 Declaration of
Paris, to which Russia was one of the original parties.
Fishing Vessels

In 1900 the United States Supreme Court held that by customary
international law fishing vessels were exempt from seizure by enemy naval forces
in time of war.! In 1907 this rule was incorporated into the Hague Convention
No. XI. Article 3 (1) of that Convention says, in part, that "[v]essels used
exclusively for fishing along the coast ... are exempt from capture." Paragraph
2 of that same article goes on to qualify that provision by stating that "[t]hey
cease to be exempt as soon :.is they take any part whatsoever in hostilities." As
we have already seen, on 23 April 1982 the British government informed the
Argentine government that, among other things, "fishing vessels apparently
engaged in surveillance or intelligence gathering activities" would be regarded
as hostile. This statement was really unnecessary as it was merely another
declaration of the British intention to apply existing law.
On 9 May 1982 the Argentine fishing vessel Nanval was attacked by British
forces and was so severely damaged that she sank on the following day. At the
time of the attack she was about 60-70 miles within the British maritime
exclusion zone, shadowing British fleet units. According to one report: "She
was not armed but she was a spy ship with an Argentine Navy Lieutenant
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Commander on board sending back infonnation about the [British] fleet's
movements.,,2 The Argentines have not denied that allegation. That being so,
the Nanval had lost her immunity and was legally subject to the treatment which
she received.

Hospital Ships
Shortly after hostilities in the Falklands began, the British government
requisitioned the SS Uganda, a vessel previously used for education cruises for
schoolchildren, converting it into a hospital ship. There were allegations that en
route to the South Atlantic the Uganda carried combat troops. 3 Ifsuch allegations
are true, this was a violation of articles 30 (2) and 33 of the Second Geneva
Convention of 1949 on the treatment of sick and wounded sailors. While extra
medical personnel may be carried on hospital ships, combat troops may not be.
The fact that after the combat troops were debarked the vessel was used
exclusively for proper purposes does not change the situation. When a hospital
ship is used for improper purposes it ceases pennanently to be entitled to the
immunity granted to such ships. During both World Wars there were numerous
claims of the misuse of hospital ships and rejection of their subsequent
entitlement to immunity. It appears that such claims are inevitable and that, all
too often, they will be justified.
The Economist (5 June 1982, p. 20) asserted that by bringing the Uganda into
Falkland Sound at night to pick up wounded and shipwrecked Argentine soldiers
the British "may have breached" the provision that hospital ships must "be
situated in such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil
their safety." The reporter or editor who wrote that article was obviously not
very familiar with the laws of war. He cited the First Geneva Convention of
1949, which is concerned with land warfare, not sea warfare; and the provision
he quoted relates to the placement of medical establishments and units on land,
not to hospital ships. Article 18 (1) of the Second Convention makes it
mandatory that" [ a]fter each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without
delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked,
wounded and sick." This is presumably what the Uganda was doing in the Sound,
and it is one of the humanitarian functions of every hospital ship.

Incendiary Weapons
Among the Argentine material captured by the British on the Falkland Islands
was a large supply of napalm, one of the most effective incendiary weapons in
military arsenals. This caused a great deal of critical comment in the British press.
Actually, even under the provisions of Protocol III of the still unratified 1980
Conventional Weapons Convention, incendiaries such as napalm are not
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outlawed, only their mode of use is restricted; and since those restrictions are all
directed towards the protection of civilians, it does not appear that they would
have been violated by Argentine use against British combat troops.

Protecting Powers
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and Great Britain were broken off
on 2 April 1982, immediately after the news of the Argentine landings on the
Falklands reached London. Shortly thereafter Great Britain requested the Swiss
government to act as its Protecting Power vis-a.-vis Argentina, presumably
pursuant to Common Article 8/8/8/9 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,
while the Argentine government requested Brazil to act in that capacity on its
behaI£ Even though they performed no major functions in the military area,
this is of extreme importance in view of the fact that it was the first clear-cut
instance of the use of Protecting Powers since World War II, despite the
innumerable international armed conflicts which have occurred in the interim.
There were, for example, no Protecting Powers in either Korea or Vietnam,
and there do not appear to be any in the Iran-Iraq War.
Civilians

Civilians presented on the whole a physical rather than a legal problem.
However, there were a number of rules of thy laws of war which came into
play. When resistance at Port Stanley ended on 2 April, Governor Rex Hunt
(in full ceremonial dress with a white-plumed Napoleon-style hat), his wife, and
his family were escorted to an Argentine Air Force plane and flown to
Montevideo, Uruguay. The British Antarctic Survey Team's civilian scientists,
based at Grytviken, on South Georgia, were also repatriated by the Argentines
after a short delay. LADE, the airline which had been operated by the Argentine
Air Force between Port Stanley and Commodoro Rivadavia, in South
Argentina, continued to fly after the Argentine takeover. While eighty to one
hundred British subjects who were living on the islands as civilian employees of
the British government elected to avail themselves of this method of departure
with their families, only twenty-one "Kelpers" so elected; and when members
of the Anglo-Argentine community in Argentina proposed that a neutral ship
be sent to the islands to evacuate the 300 children to the mainland, it was the
Falkland Islanders, not the Argentine government, who rejected the proposal.
Article 35(1) of the Fourth Geneva convention of 1949 authorizes the
departure of protected persons (civilians) from the territory of a party to the
conflict. On the basis of the Argentine claim of sovereignty over the Falkland
Islands and their dependencies, this article would have been applicable.
However, if we adopt the thesis of British sovereignty, then the departure of
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those who left the islands was an act of grace by Argentina since article 48 of
that Convention, relating to occupied territory, only requires the Occupying
Power to pennit the departure of protected persons who are not nationals of
the power whose territory is occupied-and all but thirty of the Falkland
Islanders and other residents were British nationals. (The other thirty were
Argentines.) One British subject, William Luxton, was deported, probably
because he was considered to be a subversive influence; several others were
apparently placed in a detention center at Fox Bay. Article 41 (1) of the Fourth
Convention states that the only measures ofcontrol which the Occupying Power
may adopt with respect to protected persons are assigned residence and
internment. Deportation is specifically prohibited by article 49 (1) of the
Convention but it may be assumed that Mr. Luxton preferred it to internment.
Article 42 (1) of the Convention authorizes internment if the security of the
Occupying Power makes it necessary-a decision which, of course, is a
subjective one made by that power. Accordingly, the action of the Argentines
in this respect was within the purview of and in accordance with the provisions
of the Convention.
There were estimated to be 17,000 British passport-holders in Argentina
when hostilities commenced on 2 April 1982. The Argentine government
announced that it would guarantee the safety of these individuals. Nevertheless,
on 5 April the British government broadcast a radio message recommending
that they leave the country. How many did so is unknown but there is no
evidence that the Argentine government made any effort to prevent them from
exercising the right granted to them by article 35 of the Fourth Convention,
mentioned above, to leave the territory of a party to the conflict.
Argentina claimed in a television broadcast that the British were guilty of
"indiscriminate bombing" of Port Stanley as a result of which two civilians were
killed and four were wounded. Inasmuch as more than 10,000 members of the
Argentine military forces were crowded into the area of that small town (normal
population: 1,050), with somewhere between 250 and 600 civilians who had
remained in their homes, the civilian casualties appear to have been remarkably
light. Certainly, the British bombardment and bombing of the Argentine
personnel and positions in Port Stanley cannot be said to have violated any
provision of the 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, 1907 Hague
Convention No. IX on Naval Bombardment, or the as-yet inapplicable 1977
Protocol 1. The residents of Port Stanley were British nationals and were the
persons on whose behalf the British forces had traveled 8,000 miles to fight and
there is no reason to believe that the British commanders did not exercise the
utmost caution on their behal£ Thus, when, on 13 June 1982, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed the creation of a "neutral zone"
for the protection of the civilians still in Port Stanley, the British immediately
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agreed. The Argentines did so on the following day and the ICRC announced
that it had arranged for such a zone.
Prisoners of War

Article 13 (1) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides that
"[p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely treated." Although there were
undoubtedly individual cases in which this provision was violated during the
hostilities in the Falkland Islands, on the whole the treatment of prisoners of
war, first by the Argentines and later by the British, more closely resembled the
Russo-Japanese War of1904-5 than either W orId War I, W orId War II, Korea,
or Vietnam. In this respect, as in others, the war was fought as a "gendemen's
war." Thus, although article 118 of the Third Convention merely requires the
release and repatriation of prisoners of war "without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities," the Royal Marines captured on both the Falkland Islands and
on South Georgia were repatriated almost immediately by the Argentines. So
also were two Royal Air Force technicians captured at the airfield at Port Stanley,
men who were able to provide the British with valuable intelligence
information.
When the British began to take prisoners of war, first on South Georgia and
then on the Falkland Islands, they followed the pattern established by the
Argentines of prompdy repatriating them. In fact, the practice was so regular
and so prompt that it aroused the ire of the Royal Navy when the entire crew
of the Argentine submarine Santa Fe, captured by the British at South Georgia,
was quickly returned to Argentina. As one report stated, "to give the Argentines
back a fully trained crew of submarine specialists seemed the height of folly.,,4
We have seen that article 118 of the Third Convention requires the
repatriation of prisoners of war "without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities." Despite this clear provision, India held Pakistani prisoners of war for
over two years after the complete cessation of active hostilities, from December
1971 to March-April 1974, allegedly because there was no guarantee that
hostilities would not break out again, but actually as political hostages in an effort
to compel Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh. Contrary to the procedure followed
by India, which £lagrandy violated the Convention provision, Great Britain
began the repatriation of Argentina prisoners of war immediately after the final
surrender of the Argentine forces on the Falklands. At first the British sought to
obtain a statement from Argentina acknowledging the cessation of active
hostilities. Even though such an acknowledgment was not forthcoming, the
British quickly repatriated over 10,000 prisoners of war, retaining about 550
officers, including the Argentine commander on the Falklands, General
Menendez. Within a month, despite the Argentine government's refusal to
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admit to a complete cessation of hostilities, the remaining prisoners of war were
returned by the British.
There were some instances in which it has been suggested that the provisions
of the Third Convention may have been violated. When the Royal Marines at
Port Stanley surrendered they were required to lie on the ground, face down,
under guard while they were being searched for weapons. Photographs were
made of that scene. It has been implied that the taking of those photographs
violated article 13(2) of the Convention which requires that prisoners of war be
protected against "insults and public curiosity." Inasmuch as hundreds of
photographs have been taken and published in every war of the moment of
surrender, hands held high in the air, and full-faced, with no complaints by the
belligerents, and inasmuch as it is impossible to recognize any particular
individual in the Falklands picture, there is at least a reasonable doubt that the
photograph violated article 13 (2) of the Convention.
One Argentine naval sub-officer was shot and killed while a prisoner of war,
while apparendy attempting to sabotage the captured submarine Santa Fe. The
British immediately informed the Argentine government ofthe incident through
the medium of the International Committee of the Red Cross and instituted a
Court ofInquiry, presumably pursuant to article 121 of the Third Convention.
The Argentine government was advised of the result reached by that court,
which exonerated the British guard, and apparendy it was satisfied that justice
was done.
As in all modem armed conflicts, land mines were used in the Falklands in
great profusion; at the end of hostilities, their removal became a major problem.
Article 7 of Protocol II to the as yet unratified 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention contains provisions for the J;ecording of the location of minefields.
Apparendy, as is not unusual in modem warfare, this was not done in many
instances by the Argentines, with the result that the locating and removal of the
numerous buried mines became a slow, painstaking, and dangerous procedure.
Mter W orId War II large numbers of captured German soldiers were retained
in France for the purpose of removing mines, and a substantial number were
killed or injured in the process. As a result, article 52(1) of the Third Convention
specifically provides that only prisoners of war who volunteer for the task may
be employed on labor which is of a dangerous nature, and the third paragraph
of that article provides that the removal of "mines and similar devices" is to be
considered dangerous. It has been asserted that captured Argentine soldiers were
"ordered" to clear minefields near Goose Green. If this was so, it constituted a
clear violation of the provisions of the Convention. If they were volunteers, it
did not.
Article 117 of the Third Convention provides that "[n]o repatriated person
may be employed on active military service." While the meaning of this phrase
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is subject to numerous interpretations there can be no doubt that it precludes
the use of repatriated personnel in actual combat. There are charges that some
Royal Marines, captured by the Argentines on South Georgia and repatriated
to Great Britain, were subsequendy included in the British Task Force. If this
was so, it was a violation of the provisions of the Convention.
One interesting episode occurred with respect to prisoners of war. When
Captain Alfredo Astiz, the commander of the Argentine forces on South
Georgia, surrendered to the British forces on 22 April 1982, he and the
commander of the Santa Fe, the Argentine submarine which had been captured
that morning, were entertained at dinner by the British officers. Subsequendy,
it was alleged that Captain Astiz was the infamous "Captain Death," one of the
most sadistic of the government's interrogators during the suppression of the
guerrilla movement in Argentina some years before. Sweden wanted to question
him concerning eyewitness reports that he had shot a young Swedish girl. France
wanted to question him concerning the disappearance of two French nuns. This
raised an interesting question oflaw. The offenses were alleged to have occurred
in Argentina long before the beginning of the hostilities between Argentina and
Great Britain. Assuming that they constituted violations ofarticle 3 ofthe Fourth
Convention, dealing with non-international armed conflicts, can a Detaining
Power in a subsequent international armed conflict tum over a prisoner of war
to a third state, a party to the Conventions, for possible trial and punishment?
The British answered that question in the negative, rejecting the Swedish and
French requests. Whether that decision was correct remains an open question.
Mter being taken to Great Britain, where he was subjected to what has been
described as a "token" interrogation, Captain Astiz was repatriated.
Mercenaries

One of the most difficult problems which confronted the Diplomatic
Conference drafting the 1977 Protocol I involved proposals seeking to eliminate
the use of mercenaries. Under the definition now contained in article 47 of that
instrument, one ofthe requirements for categorizing an individual as a mercenary
is that he "is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party."
The Gurkha Rifles have been part of the British Army for well over 100
years. They are recruited from an ethnic group which lives in what is now Nepal.
During World War II there were 100 battalions of Gurkhas in the British Army;
today there are five such battalions. When it became known that the 7th Gurkha
Rifles was being sent to the Falklands, Argentina protested to Nepal. Whether
that protest was based on the allegation that the Gurkhas were serving the British
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as mercenaries, or was made merely because they were Nepalese citizens, is not
known. The Gurkhas are certainly motivated by the desire for private gain. They
serve the required number of years, and then retire in Nepal as relatively
prosperous citizens. However, inasmuch as they receive a considerably smaller
pay than do British soldiers, it is doubtful that they come within the definition
of mercenaries.
Neutrals and Neutrality

Prior to World War II, during hostilities there was a dichotomy under which
all states in the world community were either belligerents or neutrals, with
well-established rules applicable to each status. At various times in the course of
World War II, Italy and Spain, and perhaps others, announced that they were
"non-belligerents." That term can be defined best by saying: "I hope that you
win, and I will do everything I can to help you, except fight." During the
Anglo-Argentine hostilities in the Falkland Islands, the United States did not
officially use the term "non-belligerent," but that was undoubtedly its status.
After Secretary Haig failed in his peacemaking efforts, the United States
announced its support of Great Britain which included a willingness to supply
any military aid short of direct involvement of American combat forces. On 29
Apri11982 the United States Senate adopted a resolution in which it declared
that "the United States cannot stand neutral." Five days later, on 4 May, the
United States House of Representatives adopted a similar resolution in which
it expressed "full diplomatic support of Great Britain in its efforts to uphold the
rule of law." In the course of the war the United States furnished the British
with a secure method of communication with its nuclear submarines in the war
zone, weather information, aviation fuel, use of the airfield on Ascension Island,
5
ammunition and missiles, and KC-135 tanker planes. A request for AWACS
was refused because it would have involved American airmen in the hostilities.
Whether the United States acted in accordance with the rules ofneutrality which
existed prior to World War II is, at the very least, questionable.
There was speculation that, despite the strong anticommunist stance of the
Argentine junta, it was receiving aid of various kinds from the Soviet Union. It
can be assumed that if the Soviet Union considered the granting of such aid to
be in its own interests, it would not have found it impossible to overlook the
ideological differences. The USSR abstained on, but did not veto, United
Nations Resolution 502, calling for Argentina to withdraw its forces from the
Falkland Islands. The Soviets also employed surface vessels and planes from
Angola and Cuba for surveillance of the British Task Force as it sailed towards
the South Atlantic. This, however, may have been routine since Soviet ships
and planes do this with respect to all naval movements of Western powers; there
is no hard evidence that the USSR passed the information so obtained to the
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Argentines. In fact, it has been suggested, with a good deal of reason, that had
the Soviet Union been doing so the Nanval would never have been sent on the
suicidal spy mission in which it was engaged when it was sunk by the British.

Implications for the Laws of War
In some important respects, the Falklands crisis offers much hope for the
continued viability of the laws of war. Despite the intense nationalistic rivalries
underlying it, the conflict illustrates that states can wage conventional warfare
in compliance with the laws of war without thereby giving adversaries a
substantial military advantage. But, on the other hand, one must be mindful of
the peculiar qualities of the Falklands War that made it possible for the laws of
war to exert their restraining influence. First, this was a limited war, fought for
limited ends with limited means. For both parties the end was quite
specific-control of a particular territory. This was not an abstract, hazy goal,
but rather a concrete, easily recognizable objective. The means, too, were
limited. The adversaries restricted their operations to the disputed territory, and
refrained from military actions against the enemy's homeland; had it not been
conducted otherwise, the war would have been much more violent and
destructive and could have released the kind of political frenzy and hatred that
weaken the observance of the laws of war. Second, the adversaries, despite
obvious differences in political regimes, saw themselves as members of the same
civilization, and shared many cultural affinities and bonds-some stretching over
centuries. This helps to explain why the war was in many respects a "gendemen's
war." Third, the conflict was brie£ It is difficult to predict how well the laws of
war would have been observed had this been a protracted struggle, filled with
the usual weariness and mounting frustration against the enemy. It is an open
question whether further conflicts that lack all these special characteristics will
have as encouraging a record on the observance of the laws of war as did the
Falklands War of 1982.
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